As World War II drew to a close, the soon-to-be victors – Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union, Winston Churchill of Great Britain and President Franklin D. Roosevelt – sat in the Crimean resort of Yalta to discuss the fate of postwar Europe. Their decisions in February 1945 helped shape the global order for the rest of the 20th century.
The heads of the world’s three largest military powers will meet again on Thursday. This time it will be President Xi Jinping of China, whose nation has replaced Britain in military power, taking on President Trump and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.
The trilateral summit in Shenzhen, China – at an uncertain geopolitical moment, followed by wars, climate change and the rise of artificial intelligence – prompted some analysts to dub it “Yalta 2.0”.
The parallel has limits, historians say. For one, Yalta was a gathering of allies whose broad goals overlapped, said Catherine Grace Katz, a historian of 20th-century geopolitics and author of a book about that summit. “Or at least apparently still allies at the time,” she said.
Until February 1945, the three Allied Powers were united in their fight against Hitler’s Germany, whose defeat was then inevitable. British and American troops had already stormed through France and Belgium, while the Soviet war machine steamrolled over Eastern Europe and squeezed Germany from both flanks.
At Yalta, the Allies agreed on what the Northern Hemisphere would look like after the dust of war had settled.
Stalin agreed to join the fight against Japan in return for territory in the North Pacific. Roosevelt—then weak, two months from his death and focused on securing Japan’s surrender—offered the Soviets wide latitude over Poland’s future. That set the stage for decades of Soviet rule over Eastern Europe.
David Reynolds, a professor of history at the University of Cambridge who specializes in 20th-century diplomacy
“‘Yalta’ is a notorious word” that for many connotes the carving up of Europe and selling out Stalin – but that is a bit of an oversimplification, he said, adding: “The fate of Europe after the war was decided on the battlefield, not at the conference table.”
At the time of the February conference, the Red Army was on its way to taking Berlin, and both Roosevelt and Churchill had privately admitted the inevitability of Soviet rule of Eastern Europe, Professor Reynolds said.
Ms Katz said: “Short of physically pushing them out of Poland, there wasn’t much the West could do.”
She also pointed out that it was a year earlier, at a meeting in Moscow, when Churchill and Stalin scribbled out their secret “percentage” agreement on a piece of paper. This led to Europe being divided between Western and Communist blocs, a division that eventually became the Iron Curtain and persisted until the end of the Cold War.
It was better not to see Yalta as the only moment when “the world was carved into this sphere of influence,” she said, but rather as the culmination of battlefield events and other wartime conversations.
That said, she argued, Roosevelt missed opportunities to squeeze more concessions from Stalin at Yalta. The president took Stalin at his word when he insisted that Poland’s leaders could not attend the conference, she said, and dismissed Churchill as urgently concerned with Poland’s future.
“Roosevelt was woefully unprepared in dealing with Stalin and understanding Russian history and Stalin’s true goals when it came to Poland,” Ms. Katz said. (Successive US administrations would similarly underestimate Moscow’s commitment to maintaining the truth about Eastern Europe, in the run-up to Mr. Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.)
Professor Reynolds said several other critical negotiations were also hammered out at Yalta, which is often forgotten.
It was the scene of hard-fought negotiations by Churchill to secure protection to prevent Germany from being eviscerated under a future capitulation, as Stalin wanted, he said. Churchill was aware that Europe must avoid a disastrous repeat of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I, the terms of which were so punitive on Germany that many believe it planted the seeds of World War II.
“It is not the purpose of the Allies to destroy the people of Germany or to leave them without the necessary means of subsistence,” Churchill told British lawmakers in February 1945, after returning to London from Yalta. “Our policy is not revenge; it is to take such measures as are necessary to secure the future peace and security of the world.”
Roosevelt also used the Yalta Conference to promote his blueprint for a new multilateral institution that would seek to resolve conflicts through deliberation rather than war: the United Nations. It was formally established nine months later.
In other words, the suggestion that Yalta was synonymous with the “carving out” of Europe by great powers flattens the story of the last years of the war, argued Professor Reynolds. “These historical events have a memory life, and all the other aspects that do not fit into the memory narrative are forgotten,” he said.